Heidiby Oros
All candidates
#91
Weak
Government Contractors
Parametricparametric

Federal Contractor Suspension Rate Threshold

Regulatory

87
Total

Buy side

Market size
60
Pain / bite
80
Recurrence
100

Sell side

Modelability
100
Resolution
100

Feasibility

Feasibility
100
MNPINo
Existing hedgeNo

Extracted facts

Category
Regulatory
Market cap exposed
$85B
Revenue at risk
$150B
Companies exposed
6
Has 10-K language
Yes
Stock move %
-56%
Historical events
5
Event frequency
Recurring
Trigger type
ParametricParametric
Resolution source
Government
Resolution accessible
Yes
Requires MNPI
No
Existing hedge
No

Research report

Demand Research Report: Federal Contractor Suspension Rate Threshold

Generated: 2026-04-18T21:55:46.381108 Event ID: federal_contractor_suspension_rate


Executive Summary

MetricValue
VerdictWEAK_DEMAND
Confidence35%
Companies Exposed0

After comprehensive investigation into federal contractor suspension and debarment risk, demand for hedging this risk appears WEAK. While government contractors show extreme revenue concentration (95-98% for firms like CACI, Booz Allen, SAIC, and ManTech), suspension events are extraordinarily rare for large publicly-traded contractors, and systemic suspension waves affecting multiple companies simultaneously have not occurred in modern procurement history. The GSA exclusion database contains primarily small businesses and individuals - not the major defense/IT services contractors who would pay for such a hedge.

Key findings undermine the claimed demand: (1) The GTSI 2010 suspension is the only clear historical example of a major contractor suspension causing material stock impact (-50%+ over 18 days), but this was a unique case involving alleged fraud, not a systemic regulatory enforcement wave; (2) Major contractors like CACI, Booz Allen, and SAIC have entered administrative agreements to avoid suspension rather than being suspended; (3) FY2020 data shows suspension/debarment actions hit a 10-year low; (4) No existing hedging products exist for this risk because it is company-specific rather than systematic; (5) Companies don't disclose quantified exposure to suspension risk in 10-Ks beyond boilerplate language.

The fundamental issue is that suspension risk is idiosyncratic (company misconduct) rather than parametric (regulatory threshold breaches). A contract based on aggregate suspension rates would not correlate with individual company stock movements, creating severe basis risk. Companies facing actual suspension risk (due to fraud investigations, etc.) would know it before markets and couldn't hedge. Companies not facing investigation have no reason to hedge an event with <1% annual probability.


Company-by-Company Analysis

CACI International Inc (CACI)

Exposure: Derives substantially all revenue from U.S. government contracts, primarily defense and intelligence agencies. Any suspension would eliminate ability to bid on new contracts.

Quantified Impact: $8.6B annual revenue (FY2025), ~95%+ from federal government. Market cap ~$12B as of 2025.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2025-06-30):

We derive substantially all of our revenue from contracts with the U.S. government or from subcontracts with other contractors engaged in work for the U.S. government. A reduction in government expenditures or a shift in budget priorities could significantly and adversely affect our future revenues and limit our growth prospects.

Current Hedging: No evidence of insurance or derivatives for suspension risk. In 2004, GSA determined no suspension/debarment was necessary after Abu Ghraib investigation. Company focuses on compliance programs to prevent suspension triggers.

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation (BAH)

Exposure: Advanced technology company with nearly complete dependence on U.S. federal government contracts across defense, intelligence, and civilian agencies.

Quantified Impact: $11.2B annual revenue (FY2025), approximately 98% from U.S. government. Market cap ~$19B.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2025-03-31):

We derive substantially all of our revenue from contracts with the U.S. government, and our business would be adversely affected by delays or reductions in government spending.

Current Hedging: Entered Administrative Agreement with Air Force in April 2012 to avoid suspension. Agreement lifted company's San Antonio office from Excluded Parties List. Paid $377M settlement in 2023 for False Claims Act violations without suspension. This demonstrates companies negotiate to avoid suspension rather than hedging the risk.

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

Exposure: Government technology integrator providing services primarily to defense, space, intelligence and civilian agencies.

Quantified Impact: $7.26B annual revenue (FY2026), approximately 98% from U.S. government contracts. Market cap ~$4.5B.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2026-01-30):

Substantially all of our revenue is derived from contracts with agencies or departments of the U.S. government or from subcontracts with other contractors engaged in work for the U.S. government.

Current Hedging: Entered Administrative Agreement with U.S. Army in August 2012 acting as lead agency for government. No evidence of third-party hedging instruments. Focus is on compliance and cooperation with suspension authorities.

Leidos Holdings Inc (LDOS)

Exposure: Large defense contractor providing technology and engineering services to government and commercial customers.

Quantified Impact: $16.7B annual revenue (FY2024), majority from U.S. government. Market cap ~$19B.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2025-01-03):

We derive a substantial portion of our revenues from contracts with the U.S. government and its agencies. A reduction in government expenditures or changes in funding priorities could adversely affect our financial results.

Current Hedging: No evidence of suspension/debarment hedging. Company was formed from split of SAIC in 2013. Relies on ethics and compliance programs.

Maximus Inc (MMS)

Exposure: Government services provider focused on health and human services programs, with significant federal and state contract revenue.

Quantified Impact: $5.43B revenue (FY2025), with U.S. Federal Services segment representing significant portion. Market cap ~$4B.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2024-09-30):

Our business depends on government appropriations and the spending policies of government agencies, and changes in these policies could adversely affect our business.

Current Hedging: No disclosed hedging for suspension risk. More diversified across federal, state, and international contracts than pure defense contractors.

Amentum Holdings Inc (AMTM)

Exposure: Global engineering and technology solutions provider supporting U.S. and allied government agencies across defense, intelligence, and civilian markets.

Quantified Impact: Post-merger with CMS in Sept 2024, combined entity serves primarily government customers. Revenue primarily government-derived.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2024-09-27):

We derive substantially all of our revenues from contracts with U.S. government agencies and any termination or reduction of our contracts would adversely affect our business.

Current Hedging: No evidence of suspension risk hedging. Company recently went public following reverse Morris trust transaction.

ManTech International Corporation (acquired 2022) (N/A)

Exposure: Was a major government IT contractor before acquisition by Carlyle Group in 2022 for $4.2B.

Quantified Impact: $2.55B revenue (FY2021), substantially all from U.S. government. Now private.

10-K Risk Factor Quote (2021-12-31):

We derive revenue from contracts with customers primarily from contracts with the U.S. government in the areas of defense, intelligence, homeland security and other federal civilian agencies.

Current Hedging: No disclosed hedging instruments for suspension risk while public. Taken private in 2022.


Historical Events

DateEventImpactCompanies
2010-10-01GTSI Corp suspended by Small Business Administrati...Stock fell from $2.99 on Sept 30 to $1.30 by Oct 11 (-56% decline over 7 trading days). Recovered partially after suspension lifted Oct 19.GTSI
2012-02-06Booz Allen Hamilton San Antonio office proposed fo...No significant stock impact found - company negotiated resolution before market reaction.BAH
2012-08-27SAIC entered Administrative Agreement with U.S. Ar...No material stock impact - agreement prevented suspension.SAIC
2011-03-14MTS Systems Corporation received suspension notice...Limited stock data available, but suspension was brief and resolved through administrative process.MTSC
2026-01-15SBA mass suspension of 1,000+ contractors in 8(a) ...N/A - affected companies not publicly tradedVarious small businesses

Market Sizing

MetricValue
Companies Exposed25
Combined Market Cap$85B
Annual Revenue at Risk$150B+

Methodology: Identified ~25 publicly-traded government contractors with >50% revenue from federal contracts. Combined market cap of major players (CACI $12B, BAH $19B, LDOS $19B, SAIC $4.5B, MMS $4B, NOC $70B+, LMT $110B+, etc.). However, most large defense primes (LMT, NOC, RTX, GD) have never faced suspension and are too diversified to be materially impacted. The 'addressable market' is really mid-tier IT/services contractors ($4-20B revenue range) totaling perhaps 10-15 companies with combined market cap of ~$85B. Annual revenue from federal contracts exceeds $150B across this group. However, willingness to pay for this hedge is minimal given rarity of events and availability of administrative remedies.


Proposed Contract Structure

AttributeValue
TypeParametric (based on aggregate suspension rate threshold)
TriggerContract would pay out if monthly GSA SAM.gov exclusions database shows suspension/debarment rate exceeding historical threshold (e.g., >X suspensions per 1,000 active contractors)
Resolution SourceGSA System for Award Management (SAM.gov) Exclusions database, publicly accessible and updated daily
SettlementBinary payout if monthly threshold exceeded, or parametric scaling based on magnitude of threshold breach

Existing Hedging Alternatives

NO EXISTING HEDGING PRODUCTS for federal contractor suspension risk. This absence is telling. Companies cannot purchase insurance against suspension because: (1) it would create moral hazard - insuring misconduct; (2) suspension is within company's control through compliance; (3) events are predictable to insiders (companies under investigation know their risk). Administrative remedies are the primary 'hedge': companies facing suspension negotiate Administrative Agreements with suspension authorities to demonstrate 'present responsibility' and avoid exclusion. Examples include Booz Allen (2012), SAIC (2012), GTSI (2010). These agreements typically involve compliance enhancements, personnel changes, and monitoring. No derivatives or insurance products exist because suspension risk is idiosyncratic and known to the company before markets react.


Supporting Evidence

10K Risk Factor

🟢 CACI 10-K FY2025

  • Company: CACI International
  • Date: 2025-06-30
  • We derive substantially all of our revenue from contracts with the U.S. government or from subcontracts with other contractors engaged in work for the U.S. government. Annual revenue $8.6B in FY2025.

🟢 Booz Allen 10-K FY2025

  • Company: Booz Allen Hamilton
  • Date: 2025-03-31
  • Approximately 98% of the Company's business is with the U.S. government, including contracts where the Company performs as a prime contractor directly for the U.S. government and those where it performs as a subcontractor. Revenue $11.2B in FY2025.

🟢 SAIC 10-K FY2026

  • Company: SAIC
  • Date: 2026-01-30
  • Substantially all of our revenue is derived from contracts with agencies or departments of the U.S. government. Revenue of $7.26B in FY2026, approximately 98% from government contracts.

Analyst

šŸ”“ Government Accountability Office

  • Date: 2024-09-01
  • GAO report GAO-24-106911 notes issues with quality of performance and integrity data in federal contractor databases, suggesting tracking of suspension rates across industry would be challenging for contract resolution.
  • Source

Hedging

🟢 Booz Allen SEC Filing

  • Company: Booz Allen Hamilton
  • Date: 2012-04-13
  • Administrative Agreement reached with U.S. Air Force, removing San Antonio office from Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) and regaining full eligibility to compete for new contracts. This demonstrates companies negotiate administrative agreements to avoid suspension rather than purchasing third-party hedges.
  • Source

News

🟔 GAO Report FY2020

  • Date: 2022-04-18
  • Federal debarments and suspensions hit ten-year low in FY 2020 according to Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee report. This contradicts claims of increasing enforcement volatility.
  • Source

🟔 Holland & Knight Legal Alert

  • Date: 2026-02-04
  • Procurement-based suspension and debarment is used to protect government's interests by excluding contractors who are not presently responsible. Process involves due process rights, opportunity for administrative agreements, and is case-specific rather than systemic.
  • Source

🟔 SBA 8(a) Suspension Event

  • Company: Various small businesses
  • Date: 2026-01-15
  • SBA suspended 1,000+ contractors from 8(a) program for missing data submission deadlines. This mass suspension event affected small businesses, not large publicly-traded contractors, demonstrating that suspension 'waves' occur in different market segments than those who would purchase hedges.
  • Source

Stock Event

🟢 Washington Post

  • Company: GTSI Corp
  • Date: 2010-10-01
  • GTSI shares plummeted Monday, falling $1.48, or 49.7 percent, to close at $1.50 after the Small Business Administration temporarily barred the Chantilly contractor from receiving new federal contracts. By Oct 11, shares fell to $1.30 representing 56% decline.
  • Source

Detailed Analysis

After exhaustive research, I conclude demand for this hedge is WEAK based on five critical findings:

  1. RARITY OF EVENTS: Only one clear historical case (GTSI 2010) of major contractor suspension causing significant stock impact. Large contractors (CACI, BAH, SAIC, Leidos) have operated for decades without suspension. The 2026 SBA mass suspension affected 1,000+ small businesses in the 8(a) program, not the publicly-traded contractors who would be hedge buyers. FY2020 saw a 10-year low in suspension actions. This is not a recurring, systematic risk.

  2. BASIS RISK IS FATAL: The proposed parametric trigger (aggregate suspension rate) would not correlate with individual stock movements. GTSI fell 56% when GTSI was suspended, not when the aggregate suspension rate changed. A company-specific suspension causes company-specific stock impact. A portfolio hedge based on aggregate rates would fail to pay when individual companies need it most. This is the fundamental flaw - suspension is idiosyncratic, not systematic.

  3. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY: Companies under investigation for potential suspension know their risk before markets. Those facing suspension proceedings (like Booz Allen in 2012 or SAIC in 2012) can't hedge because they have material non-public information. Companies not under investigation have no reason to hedge a <1% annual probability event. This creates severe adverse selection.

  4. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES EXIST: Every major contractor facing suspension has negotiated an Administrative Agreement to avoid exclusion. This is the actual 'hedge' - companies invest in compliance, cooperate with investigators, and negotiate resolution. No company has ever needed a financial derivative because the administrative process allows them to cure the issue. GTSI's suspension was lifted after 18 days through such an agreement.

  5. NO QUANTIFIED EXPOSURE IN 10-Ks: Despite reviewing numerous 10-Ks, companies only mention suspension risk in generic boilerplate ('we derive substantially all revenue from government contracts'). None quantify the probability, historical frequency, or financial impact of suspension. CFOs don't discuss it on earnings calls. This suggests it's not a material, recurring concern that would justify hedging costs.

The claimed '30-60% revenue dependence' is actually 95-98% for major players, which should strengthen demand - but it doesn't, because the event frequency is too low. Companies would rather spend on compliance than hedging. The absence of any existing hedge (insurance, OTC derivatives, or administrative contracts) after 70+ years of federal contracting is the strongest evidence that this risk is unhedgeable in practice.

Confidence is only 0.35 because there's theoretical appeal (high revenue concentration, binary outcomes), but practical barriers (basis risk, rarity, information asymmetry, and availability of administrative remedies) make actual demand negligible.


Report generated by Prophet Heidi Research Pipeline